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ABSTRACT
Each year, graduate students entering the academic job market worry that they will suffer due to
uncontrollable macroeconomic risk. Given the importance of general human capital and the relative
ease of publicly observing productivity in academia, one might expect unlucky graduating cohorts'
long-term labor market outcomes to resemble those who graduate in favorable climates. In this
paper, I analyze the relationship between macroeconomic conditions at graduation, initial job
placement, and long-term outcomes for PhD economists from  seven  programs. Using macro
conditions as an instrument for initial placement, I show a causal effect of quality and type of initial
job on long-term job characteristics. I also show that better initial placement increases research
productivity, which helps to limit the set of economic models that can explain the effect of initial
placement on long-term jobs.
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There is much speculation each year among graduate students who are leaving school about whether
they will face a “good” job market. Given the years of work, minimal compensation, and, in some
cases, large investments in tuition, it is only natural for graduates to hope to reap the beneﬁts
of their educational investments. Conventional wisdom and casual empiricism suggests that the
state of the job market is important in determining pay and initial job placement immediately
after leaving graduate school. But several economic theories suggest that these short-term eﬀects
of macroeconomic conditions can persist so that graduating in a “good” year provides an element
of randomness that can have a long-term inﬂuence on pay and the types of work people do.
In this paper, I study a set of high-skill graduates whose careers can be aﬀected by initial
macroeconomic conditions — PhD economists. There have been numerous studies of how macro-
economic conditions aﬀect large samples of people across a large set of occupations. Two potential
issues with these studies are that many employees transition slowly into the labor force, making it
diﬃcult to isolate a single “entry” point, and that the average eﬀects in these large samples may
mask interesting diﬀerences across professions. The innovation in this paper is to focus on a set of
professional graduates where the date of ﬁnal entry into the labor market is easily identiﬁable and
can plausibly be considered exogenous. While economists are not representative of the economy
as a whole, they provide a useful portrait of the increasingly important high-skilled “knowledge”
workers.
By using macroeconomic conditions at the time of graduation to instrument for the ﬁrst job
held by a new economist, I can estimate the causal eﬀect of the ﬁrst job on longer-term outcomes.
Note, however, that I do not have compensation data, so the labor market outcomes I study are
type of job and proxies for job quality. The results, therefore, have only indirect implications for
long-term wealth, but directly address issues of human capital development.
I show that ﬁrst jobs matter a great deal for PhD economists. Those who graduate when
demand for economists is high are far more likely to obtain a tenure-track position at a ranked
institution and, more speciﬁcally, are more likely to get a job at a top 50 university. Transition in
and out of attractive positions is very small, so those who start with “good” jobs are much more
likely to hold them later in their careers. By using instruments for initial demand for economists,
I argue that there is a causal link between the quality of an economist’s ﬁrst job and the quality
of his position anywhere from three to ﬁfteen years later. As I discuss in the next section, several
economic theories would predict this relationship between initial and long-term outcomes. While
I cannot fully isolate the source of the cohort eﬀects for economists, I can use publication records
to look at productivity diﬀerences among those who get good ﬁrst jobs through the “luck” of a
1good market and those who have bad luck initially. I ﬁnd that getting a “good” ﬁrst job increases
publication productivity, which suggests that models of “inﬂuence activity” and simple inertia do
not drive the results.
Perhaps the “experiment” and results are best understood through the following hypothetical
example. Consider an economist who receives his PhD during a favorable economic period when
university budgets create many open positions. Suppose this person accepts a position as an
assistant professor at Boston University (ranked as the thirtieth best economics department in
the world by Coupe (2003), twenty-second by Kalaitzidakis, Mamuneas and Stengos (2003), and
twenty-sixth by “econphd.net.”) He goes on to have a career at BU and possibly other institutions
including universities, government agencies, and the private sector. Now suppose the same person
was born a few years earlier or later and he receives his PhD during a “buyer’s market” when
school budgets are tight. Due to the lower demand for economists, he ends up taking a position at
Washington University in Saint Louis (ranked forty-eighth, ﬁfty-third, and sixty-third, respectively,
by the same authors.) The change to graduating in a less favorable climate has clearly hurt this
person’s career initially. But, some number of years after taking his ﬁrst position, is he any worse
oﬀ if he starts at Washington University than if he starts at BU? Or does the market adjust his
position over the years so that, regardless of where he starts, he ends up matched to an appropriate
institution given his skills and preferences? I show that he is much more likely to end up at an
institution of the caliber of BU if he starts at BU than if he starts at Washington University. I
also ask whether these longer-term advantages are due to the fact that his initial luck leads him to
be more productive in the initial phase of his career than he would have been had he placed at a
lower-ranked school. That is, do the advantages that might come with working at a higher ranked
school (including lighter teaching loads, higher visibility in the profession, and more accomplished
colleagues) make people more productive and, therefore, more successful over their careers? While
I cannot isolate which potential advantage of working at BU makes him more productive, I show
that he is more likely to end up at a higher-ranked job because his initial placement at BU makes
him more productive than he would have been at Washington University.
Given the measures of labor market outcomes available, I will not analyze wages. As a result,
this paper diﬀers signiﬁcantly from prior work on cohort eﬀects. In these papers, job quality is
typically deﬁned by wages. A recent example, which is similar in many ways to the exercise I
perform, is Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz (2005). They look at the early careers of Canadian
college graduates. They ﬁnd that graduating in a recession has little eﬀect on employment, but
adversely aﬀects early career income. They go on to show that these eﬀects fade over the ﬁrst
decade of a career. Most of their results are due to people accepting jobs at small, low-paying ﬁrms
2during recessions and moving to higher-pay ﬁrms (where the pay diﬀerences can be attributed to
size or industry) when the economy recovers. Kahn (2005) uses the National Longitudinal Survey
of Youth to study U.S. college graduates in the classes of 1979-1988. She ﬁnds that macroeconomic
conditions have important wage eﬀects (which are more persistent than those found by Oreopoulos
et al. (2005)) and that this is largely due to the occupations where graduates start. She ﬁnds no
eﬀect on labor supply, except that those who graduate during a recession are more likely to go to
graduate school. Oyer (2006) shows that macroeconomic conditions at graduation aﬀect the type
of ﬁrms that employ new MBAs and that this leads to signiﬁcant long-term eﬀects on labor income.
The conclusion that cohort eﬀects on pay are due to sorting among ﬁrms rather than within-ﬁrm
cohort eﬀects is consistent with Beaudry and DiNardo (1991). They show that macroeconomic con-
ditions at the time an employee starts a job are not an important determinant of wages, controlling
for the best conditions during the employee’s tenure. However, Devereaux (2004) and Baker, Gibbs
and Holmstrom (1994) show that the timing of the start of a job can have long-term wage eﬀects.
Devereaux (2004) shows that, relative to “comparable” people, workers who accept low-paying jobs
are stuck with low wages for at least several years. Some, but not all, of this eﬀect goes away for
those who switch jobs. Baker et al. (1994) document cohort eﬀects on wages within a single ﬁrm.
A large set of papers has studied economists. Many of these, including Coupe (2003) and
Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003), simply rank the research output of individuals or their institutions.1
I use these rankings to generate various measures of the quality of economists’ jobs. A smaller
set of papers, including Coupe, Smeets and Warzynski (2006) and Smeets (2004), have studied the
labor market for economists and found that the economics labor market provides incentives through
potential promotion and mobility.2 Swidler and Goldreyer (1998), Siow (1991), and Hamermesh,
Johnson and Weisbrod (1982) document that there are strong ﬁnancial incentives to generate
research. The availability of “performance” (that is, publication) information makes the economist
labor market attractive to study.3 However, the lack of salary information introduces a limitation
1See Neary, Mirrlees and Tirole (2003) for a discussion of the relative advantages of these and other rankings of
economists and institutions.
2For basic information about the market, see Siegfried and Stock (1999) and Siegfried and Stock (2004). For
a historical perspective on the market for economists, see Brook and Marshall (1974). They discuss the matching
process, describe the state of supply and demand as of 1974, and recommend starting a publication that became
Job Openings for Economists. Also, see Tervio (2005b) for a study of networks within the economics labor market
and a comparison with other academic labor markets. Goyal, van der Leij and Gonzalez (2006) study economist
co-authoring networks. There is a large literature studying academic labor markets more broadly. See Ehrenberg
(2003) for an overview of recent work and references to past studies.
3Einav and Yariv (2006) also use productivity measures and study the eﬀect of another source of luck — alphabetic
placement of economists’ surnames — on economist careers. They show that economists with last names starting
further down in the alphabet face a handicap because they are more likely to be listed later on papers’ author lists.
3in interpreting labor market outcomes. Also, because local labor markets for economists are fairly
illiquid, often requiring people to move when changing jobs, this market may not be typical of other
high-skill labor markets and the results may not generalize to labor markets more broadly.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Drawing on other work, the next section lays out
the theoretical background for why initial placement might have long-term implications. Section
3 provides details on the dataset of economist careers and productivity. Section 4 documents the
eﬀect of macroeconomic conditions on economists’ initial job placement. Section 5 shows that
initial placement aﬀects long-term placement and research productivity. Section 6 concludes with
a summary and suggestions for future research.
2 Theoretical Background
There are several economic theories that would suggest “stickiness” (or “cohort eﬀects”) in ﬁrst
jobs after graduation. That is, there are many possible reasons to think that the type and quality
of a person’s initial job will have a long-term eﬀe c to nt h et y p ea n dq u a l i t yo fj o b st h e yh o l df o r
years after starting their careers. Therefore, ﬁnding a long-term eﬀect of initial placement will not
distinguish among these models. However, using economist publication records as a measure of
productivity, I can also analyze whether ﬁrst placement aﬀects productivity. So, in the following
discussion of long-term eﬀects of ﬁrst placement, I consider each model’s implication for the eﬀect
of ﬁrst job on productivity.
Firm-speciﬁc human capital may inﬂuence the value of on-the-job investments of workers, mak-
ing them more valuable at their initial employers than elsewhere. The value provided by economists
is typically thought to be due to general human capital. But if organizations diﬀer in, for exam-
ple, their mix of research and teaching or if people become attached to their co-workers, then the
models in Lazear (2003) and Hayes, Oyer and Schaefer (2006) can generate similar implications to
classical versions of ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. Under these models, I would expect that getting a
good ﬁrst job will have a positive eﬀect on economist research productivity due to the orientation
towards research and the spillovers from more successful colleagues at top institutions.4
A related idea, with a more direct tie to the empirical analysis here, can be found in the model
developed by Gibbons and Waldman (2006) and related discussion in Gibbons and Waldman (2004).
For studies of research productivity over the life cycle in economics and the natural sciences, see Weinberg and
Galenson (2005) and Levin and Stephan (1991).
4While it would obviously come as no surprise to ﬁnd that economists at higher ranked schools have higher research
output, the predictions here and the empirical analysis below are about the causal eﬀect of a given economist (that
is, conditional on “ability”) obtaining an initial placement at a higher ranked institution.
4They suggest that initial conditions can be important in long-term labor market outcomes because
of the eﬀect on on-the-job skill development. In their model, employees develop “task-speciﬁc
human capital.” Those hired under more favorable conditions are initially given higher value tasks
and develop more valuable human capital that persists throughout their careers. In terms of
productivity, the initial investments in research skills would lead economists who place at better
institutions to be more productive (again, in the causal sense.)
Suppose people’s tastes evolve based on their experience and environment (see Frank (1984)
and Rayo and Becker (2005)). Then people who place into top institutions may get caught up in
the local norm of what is considered success, with a heavy emphasis on research. Conversely, those
who do not place as well may place greater focus on less research-oriented activities, including
teaching, community service, or their personal lives. This leads economists that initially work at
top institutions, even if they place there only due to job market timing, to be more likely to stay
at a top institution and to be more productive than initially unlucky economists.
Another class of models regarding co-workers focuses on “inﬂuence activity” (see, for example,
Milgrom (1988).) This idea would suggest that people get ahead (get tenure) based on their ability
to inﬂuence their colleagues. Those who place well initially have better long-term outcomes due to
their ability to inﬂuence people at better institutions. However, people would not necessarily be
any more productive as a result of getting a better job.5
An alternative idea, with similar empirical implications, is that the job market takes initial
job placement as a signal of ability and fails to compensate for the “luck” associated with initial
market conditions. For this idea to apply to the economist job market would imply non-rational
behavior among a group that prides itself on rationality. However, given that Einav and Yariv
(2006) suggest that economists do not properly compensate for the ﬁrst letter of each others’ last
names in evaluating one another, it seems plausible that they would also fail to fully account for
labor market conditions on ﬁrst jobs.6
Models where search is costly (either for ﬁrms or employees) also leads to frictions where initial
jobs are likely to become long-term. Models where incumbent ﬁrms have useful private infor-
mation (such as Akerlof (1970) and Waldman (1984)) about employee productivity have similar
implications. Again, pure forms of these models do not suggest that initial placement will aﬀect
5There may, however, be cases where inﬂuence activity can lead to the appearance of increased productivity. For
example, the senior economist could be a journal editor and accept her colleague’s papers or she could give her junior
colleague too much credit when they write papers toget h e r . Iw i l ln o tb ea b l et os e p a r a t et h i sf o r mo fi n ﬂuence
activity from “productive” activity.
6Siow (1991) develops a model where employers of academics rely heavily on early publications, which may aﬀect
early placement. This model also does not suggest initial placement will aﬀect productivity.
5productivity.
A recent and intriguing model that could apply to the economist market is Tervio (2005a), who
considers a case where skill is industry-speciﬁc and learned on-the-job and where productivity is
publicly observable. Workers stay at the same type of ﬁrm (though not necessarily the same ﬁrm)
even though social welfare would be improved if experienced workers were more regularly replaced
by fresh graduates. Individual ﬁrms do not have an incentive to do this, however, because a new
employee that turns out to be a star can simply leave. This model would not predict that getting
a good job will increase productivity.
3 A New Dataset of Economists
I constructed a new dataset of economist careers. Though the data itself is consistent and accurate,
the basis of the sample was somewhat random. I began by contacting economics department
chairpeople, faculty in charge of graduate placement, and administrators of graduate programs. I
either relied on my own personal contacts, the recommendations of colleagues, or I simply sent
“cold-call” e-mails to the relevant people. As far as I know, it is a universal practice among top
economics departments to create a book each Fall that contains the CVs of all graduate students
who, at the time the books are generated, expect to be on the job market that academic year. I
asked for copies of these books going back as far as I could get. Responses to this request fell into
one of three categories. First, a few schools simply ignored my request. Second, several schools
were very helpful but they did not keep copies of the old books of CVs for enough years to make it
worth pursuing. Third, seven schools had copies of the books going back to at least the late 1980s
and they sent me copies of each book from as early as they had through the Fall of 2003. While
there could be selection eﬀects in the set of schools that provided CVs, I see no reason why schools
that made CV books available would be diﬀerent in any systematic way from schools that did
not have this information. My impression from this data-gathering exercise is that the dominant
factor in a school making the CV books available to me was the existence of a graduate program
administrator who was both very organized and had been in the position for a long period.
The seven schools from which I have CV books are the University of California at Berkeley,
the University of Chicago, the University of Minnesota, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Northwestern University, Stanford University, and the University of Texas. Five of the seven have
been consistently ranked among the ten best in the world over the entire period I study. At least two
of these departments could and have made legitimate cases that they are the very best department
in the world at various points over this period. Minnesota and Texas are generally ranked anywhere
6from tenth to thirtieth in the world, depending on survey methodology.7
F o re a c hC Vi ne a c hb o o ka tt h es e v e ns c h o o l s ,Iﬁrst created a dataset of information from
the CVs themselves. I entered full names as they appeared on the CV, the research ﬁelds of the
person (or, if they did not list research areas, I used teaching ﬁelds or the ﬁelds in which the person
passed examinations), up to two primary advisors, undergraduate institution, year undergraduate
degree was received, and undergraduate major. I was able to assign gender to over 98% of the
sample. For the vast majority of the sample, I inferred gender from people’s names. When the
name did not make gender obvious, I tried to ﬁnd a picture online and used lists of names available
in “Baby Name” books and internet sites. For three of the seven schools, the graduate program
administrator was able to conﬁrm gender for those I could not otherwise ﬁgure out. For almost all
people, I created indicator variables for whether the person received National Science Foundation
Graduate and Sloan Foundation Dissertation Fellowships.8
I then attempted to track the person’s career year-by-year from the Fall of the year after the
person’s CV was in his graduate institution’s CV book through 2004. I relied on several sources
for this. Where possible, I used a current CV (which I typically found through an internet search)
or biography on a web page.9 The second choice source was the 1981, 1985, 1989, 1993, 1997,
2003, and current online directories of members published by the American Economics Association
(AEA). The 1981-1997 directories were published as part of special December issues of the American
Economic Review while the 2003 directory was made available online as a PDF document. Many
AEA members provide signiﬁcant biographical detail in these directories, while others provide no
information or only current job as of the time of the survey. The third source was initial job
placement reports provided by three of the seven schools and a current alumni directory provided
by two schools. Naturally, the placement reports were only useful for identifying the ﬁrst position
the person held. The fourth source was the aﬃliations listed for authors in the EconLit database.
The reason this source is not as good as the others is that EconLit does not typically indicate if the
person holds a visiting position. Also, EconLit does not typically identify whether a person works
7I will not identify any person or school by name for the rest of the paper. However, I would like to appeal to
readers who were PhD students at one of these schools and went on the job market between 1979 and 2004 to please
send me your current CV or resume (see cover for my contact information) so that I can minimize measurement
error. Any reader whose CV or a detailed bio is readily available through a Google search need not send me their
information.
8For a few years in the early 1980’s, one school only provided a summary table with names, advisors, ﬁelds,
and educational background. Because I did not have complete CVs with details on honors and awards, I could not
determine if these people had received NSF or Sloan fellowships.
9As an example of the distinction, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve posts biographies of their research
economists that detail the positions the people have held since receiving PhDs. The site does not provide full CVs.
7at a professional school rather than in an economics department. The ﬁnal source was indirect
information found through internet search. Examples of this varied. Two common forms of useful
indirect information were articles quoting economists (“Economist John Doe of Morgan Stanley
predicted the peso would be stable...”) and acknowledgements in articles (“We thank Jane Doe of
the World Bank for the data...”). However, there were other random helpful sources, such as a
graduate of one of the programs who posted a list of classmates he had found and their current
jobs.10
After assigning a job to a person for each year possible, I categorized these jobs along several
dimensions. For people working at universities, I created an indicator variable for tenure-track
positions (visitors, post-docs, research fellows, etc.)
In addition to these descriptions of the job, I categorized and ranked the institutions where
people worked. Using these rankings and the job information, I created ﬁve measures of the quality
of a given job. The ﬁrst two measures are based on the 2004 rankings of economics research
institutions available at www.econphd.net as of June 1, 2005. Universities are ranked from 1
to 321 and other organizations from 1 to 112. Details of the ranking system are available on the
website. Based on looking at the econphd measure of “equivalent papers”, which takes into account
the number and length of articles published, it is clear that a university of a given rank is more
productive than another organization of similar rank. I deﬁne “rank” as the rank between 1 and
321 for universities, ﬁfty plus twice the rank from 1 to 112 for other organizations, and 350 for any
organization that is not ranked at all. As examples of how schools compare to other institutions,
this makes the ranking of the top non-university organization (the World Bank) equal to the ranking
for Rutgers University and ranks the Bureau of Labor Statistics on a par with Pompeu Fabra.
Id e ﬁne “tenure-track ranked” jobs (which I will often refer to as “TTR” positions) as any
tenure-track position at a university or college that is on econphd.net rankings. Finally, “Top 50”
jobs are tenure track positions at schools in the top 50 of the econphd.net university rankings.
Qualitative conclusions are not sensitive to substituting the university rankings in Coupe (2003) or
Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003) for econphd.net rankings when deﬁning these variables.
If I knew that a person held one job in year t a n da n o t h e rj o bi ny e a rt + x, I assumed that
the person held the year t j o bi ny e a r st +1 , t +2 ,. . . ,t + x − 1. If I was not able to determine
what job a person held in a given year, I assumed that the person held a job that was not ranked
by econphd.net. The one exception to this was the way I assigned initial positions. If I ﬁrst found
the person working at a job t years after his last time on the job market, I assumed that he held
10In a particularly unusual example, I found one economist through a newspaper article about the mess left behind
by wild turkeys in the Boston suburbs.
8that position from the year after going on the market until I found him at that job. Treating these
observations the same as other missing observations has no material eﬀect on any of the results.
I use four primary measures of the state of the macroeconomy. When looking at students
looking for jobs starting in the Summer of year t, I use the level of the S&P 500 as of the end of
October of year t−1 and the unemployment rate for the U.S. as of October of year t−1.F o rm o r e
economist-speciﬁc measures of labor demand, I use the total number of jobs and the total number
of academic jobs listed in the Job Openings for Economists (JOE)i ny e a rt − 1. This information
is published annually in the JOE director’s report in the May “Papers and Proceedings” issue of
the American Economic Review.S o m eo ft h e s ej o b sc a nb el i s t e de a r l yi nt h ey e a r ,a tt h et a i le n d
of the previous academic job market. However, the vast majority of listings in JOE are in the Fall
for openings in the following year.
Table 1 provides summary statistics of the sample as a whole, as well as for each of three of the
graduate programs. To maintain conﬁdentiality of individuals and institutions, I refer to these three
graduate programs as “School A”, “School B”, and “School C.” The sample is predominantly male
and most people are American (using whether the person went to a U.S. undergraduate institution
as a proxy.) Recently, the sample has become increasingly foreign but not more female. Of those
entering the job market in the last ﬁve years of the sample, 22% were female and 49% went to
American undergraduate institutions. In all analysis that follows, I group men and women together.
In unreported analysis, I found no evidence that any of the results below vary systematically by
gender.
Fewer than half of the sample gets placed initially, or holds at any given time, a tenure-track job
at a ranked institution and about a quarter of the sample holds a position at a top 50 university.
These measures of job quality, as well as pre-graduation indications from high-proﬁle fellowships,
vary greatly between which graduate program the person attended. Publication success also varies
signiﬁcantly between schools, with those who graduate from “School C” publishing at about a 50%
higher rate than the sample average and at several times the rate of “School B” graduates.
Note that I treat everyone with a tenure-track appointment at a given institution the same,
whether they work in the department of economics, the business school, or elsewhere. This is
because I do not always know for sure what department a person works in, because some universities’
primary economics departments are within business school anyway, and, most importantly, because
the institutional rankings do not distinguish between departments within schools. I hope this merely
introduces some measurement error and attenuates any eﬀects.11
1157% of the person/years in the dataset are employment at a college or university, though only 43% are tenure-
track positions. Of the tenure-track academic jobs, 20% are in business schools, 1% in law schools, 2% in public
9Total School A School B School C
Female 21.2% 26.8% 22.7% 22.5%
U.S. Undergraduate 59.2% 75.2% 57.3% 66.7%
NSF Graduate Fellowship 11.5% 3.1% 0% 36.4%
Sloan Dissertation Fellowship 8.7% 6.5% 0% 12.5%
First Job:
econphd.net rank 161.6 163.5 294.3 113.9
(144.8) (142.6) (111.3) (132.7)
Tenure-track ranked 47.6% 44.0% 14.8% 55.7%
Top 50 29.8% 24.8% 5.9% 42.3%
All Job/Years:
econphd.net rank 186.9 190.5 301.3 147.9
(148.3) (146.0) (104.5) (146.7)
Tenure-track ranked 41.8% 38.8% 13.3% 50.1%
Top 50 25.5% 20.5% 5.9% 37.2%
Publications:
First 10 years 3.94 3.35 1.24 5.67
(5.23) (4.67) (2.33) (6.74)
Average per person/year 0.31 0.27 0.14 0.44
(0.47) (0.46) (0.32) (0.59)
Total People 2,393 420 172 537
Total Person/years 27,259 5,120 1,739 7,027
Table 1: Economist Sample Summary Statistics. “econphd.net” rank is the average of the adjusted
ranking provided on the econphd.net website. The rank is the number the school is ranked in
the case of universities, ﬁfty plus twice the ranking for non-academic institutions, and 350 for any
institution that is not ranked. “Tenure-track ranked” is an indicator variable for whether the person
holds a tenure-track position at a university that is listed on the “econphd.net” rankings. “Top
50” is an indicator variable for holding a tenure-track position at a school that is ranked among
the top 50 universities by econphd.net. The columns for “School A”-“School C” each display data
on all students who went on the job market from each of three (anonymous) graduate institutions.
10Career Year Sample TTR TTR in TTR out Top50 Top50 In Top 50 Out
1 2,325 1,122 1,122 0 707 707 0
2 2,198 1,056 17 24 669 10 13
3 2,078 1,004 23 19 637 17 13
4 1,951 935 13 23 592 12 21
5 1,840 862 20 37 540 12 29
6 1,717 753 5 58 470 3 31
7 1,590 680 15 35 418 13 30
8 1,488 620 8 30 378 7 24
9 1,378 558 5 25 336 3 24
10 1,268 500 7 29 298 8 21
11 1,150 443 2 20 255 0 21
12 1,044 395 5 14 223 3 12
13 956 366 8 12 203 6 8
14 842 325 4 10 181 3 5
Table 2: Economist Transitions. “TTR” is the total number of people holding tenure-track jobs
at institutions ranked by econphd.net. “Top 50” is the number holding tenure-track jobs at econ-
phd.net top 50 universities. The “in” columns list the number of economists who moved into the
category a given number of years into his career and “out” columns list the number who moved
out of the category. Sample size changes because the last observation for a given person is the
2003-2004 academic year.
An important part of the following analysis is to see how people transition to “better” and
“worse” jobs over the course of their careers. Table 2 provides a sense of how much movement
there is between quality tiers in this labor market. Upon leaving school, about half the sample
starts a “TTR” position and 30% start tenure track jobs in Top 50 departments. The movement
in and out of these positions is quite slow after that, however. A few people transition out of
these positions every year, with the outﬂow peaking at 6-8% in the years around the time tenure
is granted. The transition into these positions is minimal with only 1-2% of any given person/year
observation in either the TTR or Top 50 category being held by someone who did not hold such a
position in the prior year. Given the lack of movement into or out of these positions, this seems
like a market where the luck of initial conditions has the potential to matter.
Figure 1 graphs the basic supply and demand measures in the data. To insure consistency over
the sample period, the graph is limited to the three schools for which I have CV books going back
to the Fall of 1980 or before. The graph shows two of the proxies for demand (unemployment and
total JOE listings). It also shows the level of “supply” as proxied by the number of economists
policy schools, and 4% are in other departments (including schools of public health, social work, medicine, education,
consumer sciences, and international aﬀairs, as well as departments of political science, sociology, and agricultural
economics.)
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Figure 1: Proxies for Supply and Demand of Economists. All variables are normalized so that
1980 = 1. “CVs” is the number of CVs in the job market books at the three schools that were available
for all years. “Academic JOE” is the number of academic openings listed in Job Openings for Economists.
“Unemployment” is the oﬃcial U.S. unemployment rate for October.
listed in the CV books of the three schools.12 In the graph, year t denotes October unemployment,
the number of academic JOE listings during the year, and the number of CVs in the books sent
out that Fall (that is, number of people seeking jobs starting in the Summer or Fall of year t +1 .)
All variables are normalized such that 1980 equals one.
As the graph shows, there are several periods of ups and downs in all these variables.13 This
is important, as much of the following analysis is identiﬁed by inter-temporal variation in the
measures of the state of the economy. During the early 1980’s recession, unemployment spikes
and JOE listings drop. Over the years shown, unemployment moves up and down considerably
and the JOE listings generally move in the opposite direction at the same time. The correlation
between the unemployment rate and JOE listings is -0.488 and is signiﬁcantly less than zero at the
98% conﬁdence level. The correlation between the number of CVs in the books (or the number in
the books for the ﬁrst time) and the demand variables is insigniﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. This
12The book issued in the Fall of 1985 is missing for one of these schools. For that year, I assigned that one school
the average number of students in its 1984 and 1986 books.
13I did not include the S&P 500, academic job listings, and number of CVs in book for the ﬁrst time in order to
keep the graph simple. Similar conclusions can be drawn from these alternative supply and demand measures, though
the S&P 500 has only one long period of increase and one shorter down period.
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Figure 2: Macroeconomic Conditions and Initial Economist Placement. “Academic JOE”
is the number of academic openings listed in Job Openings for Economists and is normalized so that 1980
= 1. “Fraction TTR” is the fraction of initial placements into tenure track positions at schools ranked by
econphd.net. “Fraction Top 50” is fraction of initial placements into tenure track positions at universities
ranked in the top 50 by econphd.net.
provides some initial conﬁdence that economists are not generally timing their decision of when to
go on the market based on macroeconomic conditions.
4 Cyclicality of Demand and Initial Job Placement
Figure 2 shows the annual macroeconomic conditions, as proxied by total JOE listings, with two
measures of the quality of initial job market placement. The lines for the top 50 and tenure-track
ranked variables are the proportion of people who were on the market for the last time in a given
year that started jobs in these categories the following year. As the graph suggests, quality of
placement is at least somewhat cyclical. Fewer graduates get “good” jobs during the early 1980’s,
1990’s, and 2000’s recessions than in surrounding years. Figure 3 shows similar (though noisier)
trends for graduates of one of the programs.
To see this relationship between macroeconomic conditions and initial job placement more
formally, consider economist i entering the labor force in year t. At the time he looks for a job,
potential employers have a common estimate of his ability, αi. The number of positions available
are exogenously determined by the state of the economy, θt. All else equal, an economist who enters
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Figure 3: Macroeconomic Conditions and Initial Economist Placement — School C. See
notes to Figure 2 for details.
the job market when θt is relatively high will get as good, or better, a job than an economist with
equal αi who enters when θt is low. Given this, I model the initial placement of economists as
qit = αi + δθt + βXit + εit (1)
where qit is one of the measures of the quality of a job taken by economist i in year t, X is a set of
characteristics that aﬀect demand for economists (which includes indicators for individual schools
and a linear time trend), and εit reﬂects unobserved factors (such as geographical preferences or
individual preference for money relative to an academic lifestyle).
Because there is only one observation for initial placement for each person, the ability term (αi)
is part of the error term when estimating equation (1). The estimated eﬀects of macro conditions on
initial placement (θt) will be unbiased as long as supply is not related to the state of the economy.
This requires that the average quality of economists not vary systematically with θt.G i v e n t h a t
the quantity (and, many economists agree, quality) of applicants to graduate programs varies with
macroeconomic conditions, it might seem plausible that conditions when leaving graduation school
could also be related to quality of the outgoing class. I consider this issue in more detail below.
Generally, I believe it is safe to assume that θt for an economist on the job market cannot be
predicted by conditions when the economist entered school due to the four-plus years in between
14Dependent Variable econphd.net Rank TTR Top 50
Speciﬁcation OLS Logit Logit
(1) (2) (3)
Academic JOE listings -73.42 0.270 0.293
(23.29) (0.053) (0.051)
Year (trend) -0.090 -0.003 -0.002
(0.397) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 (or pseudo R2) 0.0933 0.0383 0.0545
N (People) 2,309 2,309 2,309
Table 3: Quality of Initial Placement. Each of the dependent variables is a measure of the quality of
the job held in the academic year after the person last appears in his school’s CV book. The sample
is limited to people who appear in two or fewer CV books. “econphd.net Rank” is econphd.net’s
ranking of the institution, adjusted as described in Table 1 and in the text. “TTR” is an indicator
for tenure-track ranked position. “Top 50” is a tenure-track position at a school in econphd.net’s
top 50. See text and notes to Table 1 for more details on each of these variables. All columns
include school ﬁxed eﬀects. “JOE listings” is the number of academic jobs listed in Job Openings
for Economists in the calendar year when the CV book was sent out divided by the number listed
in 1980. Unemployment rate is the U.S. unemployment rate for October of the year the CV book
was sent out. In columns 2 and 3, coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀect on probability. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are adjusted for correlation within year.
and/or that variation in the time it takes to get through graduate school insures θt is orthogonal
to average αi in a given class.14
The results of estimating (1) using three measures of qit are displayed in Table 3. Column (1)
shows results from an OLS regression where the dependent variable is the adjusted rank deﬁned in
Section 3. A lower number indicates a higher quality institution (at least as measured by “econ-
phd.net.”) The graduate school indicators, which are included in the regression and not displayed,
are economically and statistically signiﬁcant. Placement success varies systematically across these
seven PhD programs. The year trend is insigniﬁcant, suggesting that the average ranking of the
hiring institutions did not change over the course of the sample.
T h en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient on “Academic JOE listings” indicates that the average economist is
hired by a higher-ranked institution when the demand for economists (as proxied by JOE listings)
is relatively high. This relationship is signiﬁcant at the 2% level. The -73.42 coeﬃcient in column
(1) indicates that, other things equal, when the number of academic JOE listings grows by 10% of
14The evidence in favor of this assumption includes that the number of CVs in a given school’s packet is not related
to demand conditions, the fact that the number of academic listings in JOE is not correlated with the fraction of
people on the job market that have a publication by the time they ﬁnish school, and, as discussed below, the fact
that macroeconomic conditions when entering PhD studies is not correlated with job market success.
15the 1980 listings (which was slightly above the sample average for number of listings), the average
economist’s ﬁrst institution will rank about seven places higher than it otherwise would have. This
is equivalent to getting a job at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign rather than at the
University of Southern California, at Tulane rather than Oregon State University, or at the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland rather than at the Inter-American Development Bank.
Columns (2) and (3) show results from ﬁtting a logit-equivalent version of (1). The dependent
variables are indicator variables for holding a tenure-track job at a ranked institution and holding
a tenure-track job at a top 50 institution. The positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients on the JOE
variable indicates that economists are more likely to get jobs in these desirable categories when
conditions are favorable. The coeﬃcients indicate that an increase in JOE listings by 10% of the
1980 total increases the probability of each of these outcomes by about 3.0%. This is a large eﬀect,
given an unconditional probability of about a half for TTR and about a quarter for Top 50.
In unreported regressions, I also found that the unemployment rate and the return on the
S&P 500 predict initial placements. However, these eﬀects generally become insigniﬁcant when
controlling for the more economist-speciﬁc JOE measure. I also found suggestive evidence that
non-academic demand for economists makes academic jobs less attractive. When controlling for
academic JOE listings, non-academic JOE listings are associated with “worse” values of the place-
ment measures in Table 3. However, this eﬀect is only marginally signiﬁcant.
To test the potential problem that quality of graduating PhD’s is driven by conditions when
they enter graduate programs, I also performed a set of regressions similar to those in Table 3 with
proxies for macroeconomic conditions when economists began their programs. In most cases, I do
not have the exact date they began graduate studies. However, I used macroeconomic conditions
ﬁve years before the person went on the job market and conditions when they ﬁnished undergraduate
studies. I used the unemployment rate and academic JOE listings in each of these years as proxies
for macroeconomic conditions. None of these proxies ever showed a signiﬁcant relationship to rank
of ﬁrst job, whether the ﬁrst job was a TTR position, or whether it was a Top 50 position.
The estimates in Table 3 suggest that macroeconomic conditions have a large eﬀect on the
likelihood of candidates obtaining desirable academic positions. Under the assumption that macro-
economic conditions are orthogonal to average ability of economists on the job market, it appears
that “luck” plays a large part in the initial placement of economists. The next section investigates
the degree to which this eﬀect wears oﬀ as macro conditions change over economists’ careers.
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Figure 4: Macroeconomic Conditions, Initial Placement, and Longer-Term Placement
5 Initial Macroeconomic Conditions and Long-term Outcomes
5.1 Long-term Job Quality
To get an initial sense of the degree to which good initial jobs are related to long-term good jobs,
Figure 4 graphs the JOE listings macroeconomic proxy, the fraction of people in each class with
initial jobs at tenure-track ranked institutions, and the fraction that hold such jobs ﬁve years after
the last time they are in their graduate institution’s CV book. The graph shows that the proportion
holding tenure-track ranked jobs ﬁve years after graduation in any given year is closely related to the
fraction that hold such jobs immediately after graduation. This could reﬂect unobserved variation
in quality across classes. However, because the fraction with initial good placement is also related
to macroeconomic conditions, there is some reason to believe that initial macro conditions have
lasting eﬀects. Figure 5 shows a similar graph for a single school. As with the broader group of
economists from seven schools, the relationship between initial and ﬁve-year placement is close.
However, because this relationship is not obviously closer than it is for the market as a whole,
diﬀerences in unobserved quality are unlikely to explain the relationship alone because it would
seem logical to expect these eﬀects to be stronger within school-years than within a year across a
group of schools.
Figure 6 provides another graphical perspective on the development of cohorts’ careers. It shows
the fraction of any given graduating class that holds a tenure track ranked job initially, four years
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Figure 5: Macroeconomic Conditions, Initial Placement, and Longer-Term Placement
—S c h o o lC
after graduation, eight years after, and twelve years after. In the graph, the x-axis represents the
Fall of the year the person’s CV last appeared in his/her institution’s CV book. For any given year
on the x-axis, the points on the lines represent the fraction of people in that job market year that
held tenure-track ranked jobs some number of years after leaving school. The graph shows that
the relationship between initial and later outcomes is always strong but fades over the twelve year
interval.
I now more formally address the question of to what extent does obtaining a “good” ﬁrst job
aﬀect the probability of holding a good job at some future date? I start by updating equation (1)
for an economist who has been out of school for a number of years. Consider economist i who went
on the job market in year m and holds a job in year t. I model his current position as
qit = αi + δθt + βXit + φqim + εit. (2)
There are two diﬀerences between (1) and (2). First, because the person has worked for a
number of years, the set of variables in X has evolved. I now control for graduate school, indicators
for year of observation (t), indicators for years of experience (t − m), and a linear trend for year
entered labor market (m).
T h em o r ei m p o r t a n td i ﬀerence between (1) and (2) is φ,w h i c hi st h ee ﬀect of the quality of
the initial job on the current job. This parameter cannot be estimated by OLS (or, in the case of
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Figure 6: Career Progression of Cohorts. The graph is limited to the three schools for which data
is available over the entire sample period. Each line shows the fraction of each graduating cohort that holds
a tenure-track job at a ranked university some number of years after seeking initial placement.
discrete measures of q, by a logit), however. Given that I do not observe α a n dt h a ti tw i l ls u r e l y
b et h ec a s et h a tcorr(qim,α i) 6=0 ,t h eO L Se s t i m a t eo fφ w i l ln o tc a p t u r et h ec a u s a le ﬀect of a
change in the initial job. Even though I have multiple observations for each person, I cannot use
person-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects to estimate φ because qim does not vary across observations for the
same person.
Though a causal interpretation of estimates of (2) requires using instrumental variables, I start
with standard OLS and logit analyses to establish the baseline determinants of qit and to use for
comparison in later analyses that include instruments. Table 4 shows results from this analysis,
using three of the job quality measures as dependent variables. In these regressions, an observation
is a person/year at least three years after the person went on the job market for the last time.
Panel A shows OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the adjusted econphd.net rank.
The other panels show logits where the dependent variable equals one in any year where the person
holds a tenure-track position at a ranked institution (Panel B) or holds such a position at a Top
50 university (Panel C.)
Column 1 shows that economists who graduate when JOE listings are relatively high are more
likely to have a “good” job at any year in the sample. In fact, the coeﬃcients are quite similar
to those for initial placement in Table 3, though the coeﬃcient in the Panel A regression is not
19(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: OLS, Dependent Variable = econphd.net rank
Initial JOE listings -51.80 -71.67 17.35
(34.60) (45.14) (14.28)
Initial Job rank 0.7760 0.7358
(0.0191) (0.0201)
Initial Job TTR -158.87 -17.67
(8.259) (6.752)
JOE listings * 2.536
Years Out (4.887)
Year (trend) -2.076 0.2784 -2.762 -2.705 -2.735
(0.394) (4.611) (0.1722) (0.2314) (0.234)
R2 0.0662 0.0662 0.6043 0.3417 0.6072
P a n e lB :L o g i t ,D e p .V a r .=1i fp e r s o nh o l d s“ T T R ”p o s i t i o n
Initial JOE listings 0.1831 0.1200 -0.0703
(0.0899) (0.1161) (0.0754)
Initial Job TTR 0.7493 0.7156
(0.0199) (0.0287)
Initial Job rank -0.0019 -0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0001)
JOE listings * 0.0081
Years Out (0.0203)
Year (trend) 0.0062 0.0136 0.0095 0.0073 0.0092
(0.0010) (0.0192) (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0008)
Pseudo R2 0.0407 0.0407 0.5941 0.3180 0.5947
P a n e lC :L o g i t ,D e p .V a r .=1i fp e r s o nh o l d s“ T o p5 0 ”p o s i t i o n
Initial JOE listings 0.1779 0.0440 -0.0306
(0.0929) (0.1623) (0.0836)
Initial Job Top 50 0.6954 0.6637
(0.0269) (0.0304)
Initial Job TTR 0.4610 0.0458
(0.0180) (0.0126)
JOE listings * 0.0171
Years Out (0.0266)
Year (trend) 0.0048 0.0206 0.0076 0.0065 0.0076
(0.0009) (0.0250) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Pseudo R2 0.0522 0.0523 0.5809 0.3212 0.5836
Table 4: Quality of Longer-Term Job. On observation is a person/year at least three years after
the person last goes on the job market. In each regression, there are 18,994 observations covering
1,951 people. The sample is limited to people who appear in two or fewer CV books. See Table 3
for deﬁnition of dependent variables and “JOE listings.” All columns include school ﬁxed eﬀects,
year of observation ﬁxed eﬀects, and indicators for every possible number of years from when the
person went on the market to the observation. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for
any correlation within year.
20statistically signiﬁcant. In column 2, I include an interaction between the JOE listings and the
number of years from the time the person is last on the job market to the observation (t − m).
If the eﬀect of initial conditions wears oﬀ,t h i sc o e ﬃcient would indicate that the relationship
between initial conditions and job quality gets smaller over time. This would be reﬂected by a
positive coeﬃcient on the interaction variable in Panel A and a negative coeﬃcient in Panels B and
C. However, the interaction variable is imprecisely estimated and insigniﬁcant in all three panels
suggesting that there is no strong evidence that the eﬀects estimated in Table 3 wear oﬀ over
economists’ careers.
Columns 3-5 show the relationship between initial job quality and longer-term job quality.
Column 3 shows how each initial quality measure is related to that same measure for longer term
outcomes. In all cases, the relationship is quite strong and, in the case of TTR, suggests a one-
for-one correspondence between initial job quality and later quality. These eﬀects make the JOE
listings variable coeﬃcient insigniﬁcant, as shown in Column 5.
A naive interpretation of the results in Columns 3-5 would be that getting a good initial job
leads to good later jobs. However, the only way to make a causal interpretation of φ is to ﬁnd
an instrument that is exogenous with respect to qim a n do n l ya ﬀects qit through its eﬀect on qim.
That is, I need an exogenous variable that aﬀects economists’ initial position but only aﬀects later
outcomes through its eﬀect on initial conditions. Fortunately, several candidates are available.
The ﬁrst instrument is the JOE listings variable used in Table 3. From that Table, it is clear
that the JOE variable has a meaningful eﬀect on initial placement. I can see no reason why the
JOE listings when the person initially entered the labor market would aﬀect later outcomes other
than through its eﬀect on initial placement. So, as long as the standard assumptions for OLS
estimation of θt in (1) hold (and also allowing for correlation of outcomes for people on the market
in a given year), JOE listings should be a valid instrument for qim when estimating (2).
The second set of instruments is the unemployment rate, S&P 500 level, and S&P 500 return
variables. While these variables have the advantage that they are unrelated to the market for
economists and, therefore, potentially more clearly exogenous with regard to qim, they have the
disadvantage that they provide less precise estimates of initial placement. That is, these instruments
are weaker than the JOE listings instrument.
I also use indicator variables for market-entry years as instruments. This provides a more
ﬂexible speciﬁcation for eﬀect of individual years on initial conditions relative to the JOE variable.
However, the validity of these instruments requires a stronger assumption. Speciﬁcally, market
entry year is only a valid instrument if the year of entry only aﬀects later positions through its
eﬀect on initial placement. A very strong interpretation of this assumption requires that, controlling
21for school and years of experience, average economist ability does not diﬀer across the years in the
sample. The instrument is also valid under the weaker assumption that demand for economists
is inelastic with respect to quality of the new economists available on the market. If schools are
allotted a certain number of “slots” in a given year and they ﬁll those slots regardless of supply
quality, this assumption will hold.15
Table 5 shows IV results using the same dependent variables as in Table 4. All three panels
report results from two-stage least squares (so the Panel B and C results are linear probability
estimates.)16 Columns 1 and 2 use academic JOE listings as the instrument for initial placement.
In all three cases, the initial placement measure that matches the dependent variable generates the
more precise result. But in all six regressions, the point estimate indicates that initial conditions
matter. That is, if JOE listings is a valid instrument, it appears that getting a good initial job has
a causal eﬀect on having a good job later. The Panel B, column 1 estimate suggests that holding
a TTR position right after leaving school raises the probability of holding one in a later year by
55%. Given an unconditional probability of about 50%, this is a huge eﬀect. The Panel A, column
1 estimate suggests that holding an initial job that ranks one place higher initially leads to holding
a job that ranks 0.6 places higher in a later year. Panel C, column 1 shows that an initial Top 50
job increases the probability of holding one later by over 60%.
The estimates using the other macro variables as instruments for initia lj o bl e a dt os i m i l a r ,
though less precisely estimated, coeﬃcients. The estimates in column 4, which use the job market
year indicators as instruments, are also similar and they are estimated quite precisely. Though the
assumption underlying the validity of this set of instruments is more debatable, the fact that the
results are similar across all speciﬁcations provides some degree of comfort.
The evidence in the tables and graphs to this point are consistent with the notion that starting
conditions have a large impact on economists’ careers. The transition probabilities, the importance
of macro conditions on initial conditions, and the correlation between initial conditions and long-
term outcomes all suggest that seasoned economists are far more likely to hold a “good” job if they
start with a “good” job. The IV estimates in Table 5 imply that this relationship is strong and
causal.
One concern with the estimates in Table 5 is that they include multiple observations on the
15While the year instruments have the most explanatory power in the ﬁrst stage regressions, they use up the most
degrees of freedom. Therefore, these ﬁrst stage regressions have lower F-statistics than when I use the JOE or macro
instruments. The ﬁrst-stage F-statistics in the IV analyses in the rest of this section vary from 12.4 to 32.9. In the
next section, where I reduce the size of the dataset considerably, the ﬁrst-stage F-statistics vary from 3.9 to 16.9.
16I use linear probability two-stage least squares because it is relatively simple to implement, makes interpretation
easier, and, according to Angrist (2001), is an appropriate empirical approach in contexts such as this.
22(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: 2SLS, Dependent Variable = econphd.net rank
Initial Job rank 0.6024 0.5460 0.7551
(0.1794) (0.2751) (0.1060)
Initial Job TTR -155.53
(85.26)
Year (trend) -2.558 -2.697 -2.443 -2.733
(0.338) (0.626) (0.435) (0.209)
Instrument(s) JOE JOE Macro Job Market Year
Panel B: 2SLS, Dep. Var. = 1 if person holds “TTR” position
Initial Job TTR 0.5499 0.5496 0.6643
(0.2232) (0.3063) (0.1562)
Initial Job rank -0.0021
(0.0011)
Year (trend) 0.0084 0.0079 0.0083 0.0079
(0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0011)
Instrument(s) JOE JOE Macro Job Market Year
Panel C: 2SLS, Dep. Var. = 1 if person holds “Top 50” position
Initial Job Top 50 0.6111 0.4176 0.5593
(0.2949) (0.1758) (0.1405)
Initial Job TTR 0.5343
(0.2432)
Year (trend) 0.0086 0.0069 0.0060 0.0068
(0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0007)
Instrument(s) JOE JOE Macro Job Market Year
Table 5: Quality of Longer-Term Job. An observation is a person/year at least two years after the
person last goes on the job market. In each regression, there are 18,994 observations covering 1,951
people. The sample is limited to people who appear in two or fewer CV books. In each column,
the measure of initial placement is instrumented using the listed set of instruments. See Table 3
for deﬁnition of dependent variables and “JOE”. “Other Macro” indicates the S&P 500 level and
one-year return as of the end of October and the October unemployment rate of the year the CV
book was distributed. All columns include school ﬁxed eﬀects, year of observation ﬁxed eﬀects,
and indicators for every possible number of years from when the person went on the market to the
observation. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for any correlation within year.
23same people. While I took the more conservative approach of clustering for within-graduating-
cohort correlation, the standard errors could be understated due to within-person correlation across
years. I also ran these regressions looking at a single point in careers (such as ﬁve years after
leaving school or ten years after leaving school.) The results are generally similar, though the
statistical signiﬁcance varies from year to year (and across instrument choice.) For years further
from graduation, the eﬀects dissipate somewhat and (because the sample size decreases when I
condition on a higher number of years since leaving school) become noticeably less precise.
These results have several implications. First, they suggest that a ﬂedgling economist who
wants to spend his career at a leading institution can increase the odds of that occurring by looking
for a ﬁrst position when job market conditions are favorable. As the large “local average treatment
eﬀect” literature highlights, the estimates in Table 5 do not apply to all economists. Rather, these
estimates should be thought of as relevant to those whose initial placement is aﬀected by the state
of job market. There is probably a very small set of superstars that would get oﬀers from top
institutions in any year and a larger subset of economists that would never be a good match for an
academic research environment. However, for the potentially large group whose ﬁrst job might be
driven partially by macroeconomic conditions, the evidence suggests that starting conditions have
a large causal impact on economists’ careers.
Second, an underlying assumption of this analysis is that people would generally agree that
job quality is represented by econphd.net or other rankings. Naturally, there are variations in
geographical preferences, research styles, and other things that aﬀect happiness on the job. But
preferences and skills evolve over careers. Those economists who, because of bad timing, end up
at lower ranked schools where they invest in teaching rather than research skills might ﬁnd it hard
to move to a more research-focused school. Their comparative advantage in teaching may make
it eﬃcient and preferable for them to stay at their initial employer even if “better” opportunities
arise. That is, economists may invest in what Gibbons and Waldman (2004) call “task-speciﬁc
human capital” and, conditional on initial placement, may obtain higher utility by staying with
their ﬁrst employer than switching to a school that they would have preferred initially.
Finally, none of the analysis to this point has uncovered the reasons for these cohort eﬀects. Is
it simply the case that preferences evolve and/or that the costs of moving positions is too high?
Or do economists who get better initial positions “deserve” better positions later because they
obtain more human capital? Though I will not be able to determine exactly which factors create
t h ec o h o r te ﬀects, I can at least narrow down the possibilities by determining if initial placement
aﬀects economist productivity. The next section explores this issue by examining the relationship
between research output, initial placement, and later placement.
245.2 Research Productivity
I now consider how initial placement aﬀects research output. As discussed in Section 2, some
theories that are consistent with the long-term eﬀects of initial jobs demonstrated in the last
section predict that initial placement will aﬀect productivity. Others do not predict a direct eﬀect
of ﬁrst job on productivity. By using publishing activity as a measure of productivity, I can take
some steps towards discriminating among possible explanations for long-term eﬀects of initial jobs.
I gathered information on economist productivity by compiling a list of all journal article publi-
cations of each economist listed in the online version of “EconLit.” Economists in the career sample
were matched to EconLit using full names. I hand checked any outliers where a person had many
publications but did not have a research job or few publications but worked at a top institution.
These cases usually were rectiﬁed after determining that there were multiple economists with the
same name17 or that the person publishes under a slight variant from the name on their job market
CV. However, there is likely to be at least some (hopefully innocuous) measurement error.
Id e ﬁne a categorical variable, which I will call “publication group”, that equals zero for those
who have never published (37% of the sample after ten years), one for those with one or two
publications (19%), two for those with three to ﬁve publications (17%), three for those with six to
ten (17%), four for those with eleven to twenty (9%), and ﬁve for those with more than twenty (the
remaining 1.5%.) This categorization was based on a taste for round numbers and the fact that it
seemed to break people into groups one might reasonably describe as “superstars”, “stars”, “solid
research contributors”, and so on to those who never published. It was the only categorization that
I tried. Figure 7 shows the distribution of publication counts ten years after leaving school (both
the density function and the cumulative distribution).
I also created an indicator variable that I will call “Big 5” that equals one if the person has
ever published a paper in one of the journals generally considered to be the top ﬁve general interest
journals. These include the American Economic Review, Econometrica,t h eJournal of Political
Economy,t h eQuarterly Journal of Economics,a n dt h eReview of Economic Studies.18
The analysis that I discuss in the text and that is displayed in Table 6 is based on publication
category and the Big 5 indicator. In addition to these variables, I also did analyses where I deﬁned
the dependent variable as the total number of papers, the number of papers in Big 5 journals,
publications in the journals econphd.net includes in compiling its rankings, and publications ranked
17Kevin Murphy and John Roberts are especially problematic economist names.
18Though these journals are more commonly known as the “Top 5”, I use “Big 5” to minimize potential confusion
with the “Top 50” university variable.
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Figure 7: Publication Distribution. The sample is limited to economists ten years after leaving
school. The solid line indicates the proportion of the sample that have each possible number of publications,
with twenty including those with twenty or more. The dotted line shows the cumulative distribution, so it
indicates the percentage of the sample with a given number of publications or fewer.
in Kalaitzidakis et al. (2003). The results were quite similar to those presented below. One might
argue that citations is a better measure of productivity than publications. However, I was only able
to gather information on number of citations at the present time and so it is not possible (at least
not at reasonable cost) to get a consistent measure of citations over a person’s career.
The analysis of publications is similar conceptually to the analysis of long-term jobs. I regress
publication records as of some number of years after leaving school on measures of the quality of
ap e r s o n ’ sﬁrst job and/or measures of demand for economists when the person went on the job
market.19 I then instrument for quality of ﬁrst job with macro variables that were shown to aﬀect
ﬁrst placement in Section 4, but that should not aﬀect research productivity other than through
their eﬀect on initial placement. I also instrument for initial placement with a full set of indicator
variables for the year the person went on the job market.
Unlike the long-term placement regressions above, I only use one observation per person in
any given regression. This is because any measure of publications should include the “stock” of
19Grove and Wu (2006) also study factors that are correlated with economists’ research output. They focus on
variables that are observable from graduate school applications. Unless there is some imperfection in the economist
labor market, the eﬀects of these variables should be captured by the quality of initial placement and the state of the
job market.
26publications to date (at least over the number of years I analyze here). In picking the number
of years after the person leaves school, there is an important trade-oﬀ between reducing the noise
publication lags create in early career publication counts against the fact that each year I wait
requires throwing one graduating class out of the data. I ended up settling on ten years. The
relationship between job quality and publications is non-existent when using seven years and a bit
stronger when using twelve years. The mean, median, and mode publications ten years after going
on the job market are 3.9, 2, and zero, respectively.
Each regression controls for a linear trend in calendar years because, as publication cycles and
paper complexity have increased over time (see Ellison (2002b) and Ellison (2002a)), this should
lower publication counts at any given point in people’s careers. Controlling for year squared and
year to the third power generally increases the estimates of the eﬀects of interest in the following
analysis, but also increases standard errors.
Panel A of Table 6 shows the results of IV regressions where the dependent variable is the
publication category. The odd columns attempt to isolate the causal eﬀect of a good ﬁrst job on
publications by using macro conditions to instrument for the ﬁrst job. The even columns use year
indicators as instruments. All point estimates lead to the conclusion that there is a strong causal
eﬀect of getting a good ﬁrst job on publications. Putting the coeﬃcients in some perspective,
the estimates in columns (1) and (2) indicate that getting a job at, for example, BU rather than
Washington University leads a person to move up by 0.1-0.2 publication categories. It is hard to
put this number into an exact ﬁgure, but it is roughly an extra paper for someone who publishes
10-15 papers in ten years.
Panel B shows results where the dependent variable is an indicator for a Big 5 publication. The
estimates using adjusted rank show a small eﬀect, which is likely due to the fact that publication in
these journals is rare and is heavily concentrated at highly ranked schools. However, the estimates
in columns (5) and (6) indicate that placement at BU, for example, increases the probability of
publishing a Big 5 paper by 50% relative to a job ranked outside the Top 50.
The results of the analysis are consistent and suggest that the productivity eﬀect of getting a
good ﬁrst job are large. However, the results are not overwhelming in terms of statistical signiﬁ-
cance. The evidence suggests that there is a causal eﬀect of getting a good ﬁrst job on publication
records and that at least some of the long-term eﬀects of getting a good initial placement as an
economist are due to this placement making the person more productive. This rules out a very
strict form of inﬂuence activity, asymmetric information, or search cost models being the primary
reason for long-run eﬀects of initial job placement. The evidence seems consistent with the idea
that economists develop “task-speciﬁc” human capital as in Gibbons and Waldman (2006). Those
27(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Publication category after 10 years
Initial Job rank -0.0077 -0.0036
(0.0059) (0.0016)
Initial Job TTR 1.4796 1.0682
(0.9277) (0.5808)
Initial Job Top 50 1.9028 1.6200
(1.2736) (0.6725)
Year (trend) -0.0124 -0.0239 -0.0124 -0.0144 -0.0051 -0.0079
(0.0083) (0.0084) (0.0083) (0.0080) (0.0111) (0.0086)
Instrument JOE Year JOE Year JOE Year
Panel B: Dependent Variable = 1 if at least one “Big 5” paper after 10 years
Initial Job rank -0.0023 0.0001
(0.0021) (0.0004)
Initial Job TTR 0.4443 0.3348
(0.2287) (0.1521)
Initial Job Top 50 0.5713 0.4635
(0.2582) (0.2721)
Year (trend) -0.0063 -0.0026 -0.0010 -0.0016 0.0012 0.0002
(0.0049) (0.0028) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0032) (0.0036)
Instrument JOE Year JOE Year JOE Year
Table 6: Publication Records. An observation is a person ten after he/she last goes on the job
market. The dependent variable in Panel A equals 0 if the person has no EconLit journal articles,
1 if he has 1-2 publications, 2 if he has 3-5, 3 if he has 6-10, 4 if he has 11-20, and 5 if he has more
than twenty. The dependent variable in Panel B equals 1 if the person has published a paper in
a “Big 5” journal (see text for journal list.) There are 1,259 observations in each regression. The
sample is limited to people who appear in two or fewer CV books. Ranks, TTR, and Top 50 are
deﬁned in Table 3. The instruments are deﬁned in Table 4. All regressions include school ﬁxed
eﬀects. “Year” instruments is a set of indicator variables for the possible years of going on the job
market. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for any correlation within year.
28who place at research-focused institutions develop research skills that lead to more publications.
It could also be the result of peer eﬀects from better colleagues or from initial job placement en-
dogenously aﬀecting economists’ ambitions and preferences. Naturally, the true underlying model
is probably some combination of these possibilities.
6 Conclusions and Further Research
At least among economists, “good” jobs are very persistent. Economists who work at top research
jobs start at top research jobs. While some of this is because top universities hire researchers with
obvious potential, some is just the luck of the job market when people graduate. Unfortunately,
given the limits of the available data, it is impossible to say for sure how much luck matters relative
to skill. I also cannot determine how much of the causal eﬀect of initial placement on later placement
is due to the increase in productivity other than to say productivity explains at least some of the
eﬀect. I hope to identify more details of how the market for economists works in future work, as I
continue to improve the data and model the underlying labor market in more detail.
One implication of this study is that graduating economists who are not at the very top or very
bottom of their cohort may reap long-term beneﬁts by timing their market entry to coincide with
a strong job market. But if that strategy became too common, the beneﬁts of using it would likely
diminish.
Another key lesson here is that those economists who, because of bad timing, end up at lower
ranked schools may ﬁnd it hard to move to a more research-focused school. In part, this may occur
because they develop skills, perhaps especially teaching skills, which give them a comparative ad-
vantage with their initial employer even if “better” opportunities arise. That is, a typical economist
may invest in what Gibbons and Waldman (2006) call “task-speciﬁc human capital” and, condi-
tional on initial placement, may obtain higher utility by staying with the type of employer he ﬁrst
works for rather than switching to a type of institution that he would have preferred initially. It
appears that initial job market luck aﬀects top positions in academia, drives research productivity
between neighboring cohorts of graduates, and may also move large amounts of wealth.
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